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When the Arab Spring erupted in late 2011, many analysts predicted the violence would spread 
to Central Asia. Like many Middle Eastern states, Central Asian republics are largely 
authoritarian, neo-patrimonial, and penetrated by outside powers. In both regions, borders 
have been drawn by imperial powers, cutting across supra-state Islamic, ethnic, and tribal 
identities. 
At the same time, the two regions are different in other ways. Many Middle Eastern states 
emerged from intense struggles for independence and have since been wracked by instability 
and war. By contrast, Central Asian states were, generally, born without violent conflict, have 
had no inter-state wars, and have experienced much less by way of domestic instability.  
While Middle Eastern regimes have relied on anti-imperialism and pan-Arab rhetoric to build 
their legitimacy, most post-independence Central Asian states have maintained close ties with 
their ex-imperial power, Russia, and suffered from less of a legitimacy deficit. During the Arab 
Spring, Central Asian states worked together to contain possible spill over, instead of 
promoting instability against one another, as some Middle Eastern countries did.  
To fully understand the reasons for these and other differences, and how they may help explain 
Central Asia’s immunity to the Arab uprising, it is critical to examine the colonial pasts of 
these neighboring regions and the ways they have been impacted by the empires that ruled 
over them. 
A Sharp Divergence 
Comparing the similarities and differences between Central Asia and the Middle East was 
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the focus of a research project by the St. Andrews University Institute of Middle East, Central 
Asia, and Caucasus Studies. The results of the study were published in an edited volume1 and 
summarized in a journal article.2 One of the main hypotheses of the study was that variations 
in empire affect post-imperial stability.  
As the study found, the main sources of post-imperial conflict in the Middle East and Central 
Asia include 1) irredentism that arises when groups seek to bring state boundaries into 
congruence with their identities; 2) non-inclusive regimes that do not provide citizens with 
opportunities to participate politically or engage economically; and 3) revisionism that occurs 
when radical movements or states try to challenge the regional order left behind by empires.  
In both Central Asia and the Middle East, most governments 
have been non-inclusionary, and non-oil states in both regions 
have been particularly susceptible to civil war. Where the two 
regions part, however, is on issues of irredentism and 
revisionism, which are low in Central Asia but high in the 
Middle East. The reason for this divergence can be found in the 
impact of regions’ colonial past on three factors, detailed below. 
The Role of  Identity  
Empire is experienced differently, depending on whether it frustrates or accommodates pre-
existing identities. In the Middle East, a strong sense of identity, rooted in centuries of unity 
under Islam, predated Western imperialism. This sense of self was disrupted when World 
War I’s Western victors fragmented the region into multiple states under their respective 
spheres of influence.  
Powerful supra-state ideologies, like Arabism and 
Islamism, rose to fill the identity gap. To remain 
legitimate, Middle Eastern regimes had to be seen as 
acting in the interest of the larger supra-state (Arab-
Islamic) community against widely perceived threats from 
Israel and the West. Regimes that remained dependent on 
Western powers were seen as failing in these obligations. 
Many of these regimes were overthrown in a wave of 
revolutions in the 1950s-60s.3 During this same period, irredentism was also pervasive. Both 
then and now, the two peoples denied statehood, the Kurds and Palestinians, were at the 
center of regional conflicts. 
By contrast, Central Asia’s republics fostered, rather than frustrated, identities. While 
Western empires drew Middle Eastern borders for strategic convenience, Soviet 
ethnographers meticulously took identity, language, and economic viability into account when 
drawing local borders.  
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During the Soviet period, the central government in Moscow gave Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Tajiks, 
Turkmens, and Uzbeks land they had long recognized as their own. Still, some errors were 
made, including a mismatch between ethnic and political boundaries in the Ferghana Valley, 
where Uzbeks spilled across the borders of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a 
result of the boundary delimitation process, Tajiks also lost much of their territory to 
Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, neither these nor other Central Asian groups harbored post-Soviet 
irredentism.  
Since independence, Central Asian states have been free from the de-legitimizing effects of 
pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic identities. While Islam is part of these new states, it has not, for 
the most part, taken a revolutionary or politicized form.4 For its part, Pan-Turkism has long 
been a shallow, elite phenomenon that has never been remotely comparable in influence to 
Pan-Arabism.  
Inclusion and Modernization 
Whether empires create enduring anti-imperialist sentiments also depends on the indigenous 
elite’s political integration and the rate of economic modernization.  
For many Western empires, colonies were acquired for commercial reasons and located far 
from the imperial state. As a result, political integration and inclusion in imperial governance 
did not, by and large, occur in these places. By contrast, in the Soviet Union, regional elites 
were assimilated into Soviet political culture and represented in central bodies that governed 
the empire, albeit through authoritarian practices.  
Russians did not, as an ethnic group, dominate their empire as the 
British did theirs.5 As a result, non-Russians could simultaneously 
be part of the Soviet system, as well as their own national group (in 
what was termed “dual assimilation”). The Middle East’s 
indigenous people could, however, never be British or French, 
though there were some limited moves in that direction in 
Francophone North Africa.  
Economically, Western imperial states incorporated the Middle East into the global economy 
by breaking up the Ottoman Empire, snapping regional interdependencies, and reorienting 
economic links, so that colonies supplied raw materials to Western industries and served as 
markets for Western manufacturers. The West’s Middle Eastern subjects were taxed to 
support their occupiers’ armies and pay off debts incurred before Western conquest. Imperial 
powers invested very little in education or development in these colonies, with the exception of 
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modernizing the agricultural export sector and building infrastructure linking the region to 
global markets.6 
In the Soviet empire, Central Asia’s various economies were centrally run, with budgets 
controlled by Moscow. While the more peripheral parts of Central Asia, like Tajikistan, 
remained underdeveloped, the Soviet Union did make significant industrial investments in the 
region.  
Though Russians made up the majority of skilled 
workers, engineers, and managers, natives received 
priority for local government jobs. The Soviets also 
promoted mass literacy and urbanization in Central Asia, 
which brought the region even closer to Russia. 
Following independence, many Central Asian states 
experienced a reversal in these developmental gains.  
Differences in Mobilization Against Empire 
Because of these  factors, the Middle East witnessed a far 
greater degree of nationalist mobilization against 
imperialism than Central Asia did. While the Central 
Asian republics begrudgingly separated from the Soviet 
Union after its implosion in 1991, many Arabs fought to 
end Western rule, as well as the socio-economic and 
political inequalities created by their Western overlords.  
Since the failed Baghdad Pact in 1955, it has been unpopular in the Middle East to associate 
with former imperial masters or other powerful Western countries, like the United States. In 
the post-imperial era, counter-hegemonic movements and revisionist states have repeatedly 
sought to break links with the West, using supra-state identities, like Pan-Arabism (Nasser’s 
Egypt, Saddam’s Iraq) or Pan-Islam (Khomeini’s Iran), to legitimize their efforts.  
By contrast, in Central Asia, pre-independence autonomy movements and grievances against 
Moscow did not generate mass anti-Soviet sentiment before or after independence. Indeed, 
Central Asian populations voted to maintain their relationship with the Soviet Union just 
before its break-up. In striking contrast to the Middle East, Soviet credentials helped 
legitimize Central Asia’s emerging, post-independence leaders. The idea of a Commonwealth 
(CIS) joining Russia and its former colonies was also popular and officially established in 1991, 
and continues to this day.  
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Central Asia’s pro-Russian thrust has manifested in nostalgia for 
the Soviet era, as well as emigration to Russia. At the elite level, a 
shared post-Soviet political culture continues to exist. These 
sentiments have made current, Russian-led security arrangements 
less controversial than the United States’ military presence and 
security treaties in the Arab world. This includes the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, which is a mutual defense alliance 
between Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and various Central Asian 
republics.  
Arab Uprising vs.  Central  Asian Quiescence  
When they first began to unfold, the Arab Spring protests raised questions about whether 
similar uprisings could spread to Central Asia. Two revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, as well as the 
2005 Andijan riots in Uzbekistan, suggested that, two decades after independence, Central 
Asia might experience the kind of instability found in its neighbors to the south. 
When the Arab uprisings did not spread to Central Asia, analysts argued that the region’s 
immunity was a result of better economic conditions created by job opportunities in Russia, 
lack of viable opposition parties, more effective repression of Islamists, low Internet 
penetration, more robust controls over civil society, and popular fear of instability.  
But, there was more to it than this. Building on their experience with containing the “Color 
Revolutions,” Central Asian states increased their security measures and targeted social 
media, in particular. While a shared Arab identity and language facilitated the uprisings’ 
contagious effects across the Arab world, in Central Asia, there were barriers to transmitting 
shared grievances because of different national languages, as well as a news media dominated 
by the Russian tongue. Large geographic landmasses with low population densities also 
impeded the formation of coordinated opposition movements in the region. 
In the Middle East, the League of Arab States was used by 
Gulf monarchies to encourage unrest in rival states, specifically 
Syria. By contrast, the member states of regional organizations 
in Central Asia pooled their resources to defend the status quo. 
Joint exercises between Russian and Central Asian forces in the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization were explicitly aimed 
at preventing the spread of unrest. 
International conditions were also less favorable for revolution in Central Asia. The United 
States needed stable regimes in the region to guarantee its supply lines in Afghanistan. China 
had energy access arrangements with local regimes, while Russia was determined to counter 
what it saw as Western inspired subversion in its “Near Abroad.” In the Middle East, the 
United States and the EU had long been engaged in democracy promotion. And, while 
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!generally ambivalent about the revolts, they accepted the overthrow of their Egyptian and 
Tunisian allies and actively intervened to oust the Libyan regime.  
More importantly, as demonstrated above, Middle Eastern countries were more vulnerable to 
revolution than Central Asian regimes because of the differential impact made by empires that 
had once ruled them. Middle Eastern countries suffered from greater legitimacy deficits 
compared to their Central Asian counterparts. Western imperialism and periodic post-
imperial intervention, notably in Palestine and Iraq, kept anti-imperialism alive in the Middle 
East and delegitimized alliances with former imperial states and the United States. This 
contributed to the weakness of Arab governments in the face of revolutionary forces.  
In the Middle East, powerful transnational Islamic movements also defied and operated 
across artificial state boundaries, while, in Central Asia, transnational Islam remained weak 
because of its late emergence, blanket state-led repression, and the secularization of society 
under Soviet rule. These transnational Islamic movements, particularly ISIS, have had 
devastating effects on the Middle East.  
The Power of  Imperial  Legacies 
The experience of empire continues to affect the development of states in the Central Asian 
and Middle Eastern regions. In Central Asia, empire did not leave behind intractable conflicts 
or inspire anti-imperial movements among the region’s initially “reluctant sovereigns.”7 The 
situation was almost completely reversed in the Middle East. The legacy of this differential 
experience is playing out and will likely continue to unfold in both regions, for some time to 
come. 
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